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Have Public Finance Principles   
Been Shut Out in Financing New Sports  
Stadiums for the NFL in the United States? 
 
 
by 
Robert A. Baade 
and  
Victor Matheson 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Sports facilities in the United States for the four major professional sports leagues 
have been built recently at an unprecedented rate when the entire experience of the 
twentieth century is considered.1  Taxpayers in the host communities have shouldered the 
burden to a substantial degree.2  The purpose of this paper is to determine if the financing 
methods through time and currently have honored public finance principles relating to 
equity, efficiency, and transparency.  If not, why not?  Attention in the paper is focused 
on the National Football League (NFL) in part because it is arguably the most popular 
and prosperous of the four major professional sports leagues in the U.S., and the NFL has 
the most comprehensive revenue sharing arrangement, which has implications for various 
hypotheses identified and analyzed in this report.  The evidence and analysis contained in 
this report suggests that the NFL has been able to use the excess demand for its’ teams to 
induce cities to provide subsidies for stadiums that result in substantial increases in 
revenues, franchise values, and player salaries.  The team financial gains are partially the 
result of appropriating a portion of fan/consumer surplus.  Only the largest cities are 
capable of negotiating with the NFL on near equal footing, and only through collective 
action can cities counter the NFL’s dominance in negotiating stadium deals and other 
contracts.  
 
 The first part of this paper identifies those public finance principles that are 
commonly invoked in designing and evaluating projects that are publicly funded.  In the 
second part of the paper developments in funding NFL stadiums are identified and 
analyzed.  The analysis will include those imperatives that account for any notable 
changes in the manner in which stadiums or teams are funded.  In the paper’s third 
section the current funding schemes are evaluated using the public finance criteria 
identified in the first section of the paper.  The final section of the paper concludes the 
work and offers some policy suggestions. 
 
                                                 
1 For the statistics on the number of stadiums built, see Robert A. Baade, “Evaluating Subsidies for 
Professional Sports in the United States and Europe:  A Public Sector Primer,” Oxford Review of Economic 
Policy, 19, no. 4 (Winter 2003): 587.  
2 Ibid. 
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II.  Evaluating Proposals for Publicly Funded Projects 
 
 Public officials generally subscribe to the idea that public funding for projects 
should observe principles of equity and efficiency.  Equity considerations are based on 
the “benefit principle,” the straight forward proposition that the tax burden imposed on 
anyone for a publicly funded project ought to reflect the benefits they derive from it.  
This principle was articulated by political economists even before Adam Smith who 
spoke eloquently about the need for equity in the tax system.  Smith observed: 
 
 The subjects of every state ought to contribute towards the support 
of the government, as nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective 
abilities; that is in proportion to the revenue which they respectively enjoy 
under the protection of the state…  In the observation or neglect of this 
maxim consists, what is called the equality or inequality of taxation.3    
 
 The benefit principle cleanly links tax policy to expenditures, and this linkage is 
the most appropriate basis for discussing equity in the funding of professional sports 
facilities.  Indeed, the use of the benefit principle in evaluating the equity of any tax 
system would apply in cases where the use of the tax proceeds clearly benefits certain 
groups.  Tax policy historically in the United States and elsewhere also has reflected the 
“ability to pay” and “sacrifice” principles, neither of which recognizes any tax-
expenditure link. 
 
 Individual tax- expenditure programs are well suited for an up-or-down vote 
through a referendum if the benefits from the expenditure to particular taxpayers are 
known.  Operationally, in many instances, benefits are so diffuse that they elude 
measurement or are otherwise not apparent.  A lack of transparency vitiates the use of the 
benefit principle.  Taxes to fund sports stadiums, however, potentially can be evaluated 
using the benefit principle since the gains are concentrated in the hands of a few groups 
and are theoretically measurable.  In fact it could be argued that a sports facility financed 
publicly provides a “service” for people using the facility, i.e., the fans, and benefits for 
players and owners in the form of increased incomes and profits.   
 
The case for direct charges to finance certain types of economic infrastructure has 
long been considered by public finance scholars.  Consider this passage from a classic 
public finance text. 
 
The case for finance by direct charges to the uses is clear-cut where the 
goods or services provided by government are in the nature of private 
good, i.e., where consumption is wholly rival.  Benefits can be imputed to 
a particular user who can be asked to pay.  The issuance of licenses, the 
financing of municipal transportation, and the provision of airport 
facilities are more or less in this category.  Where benefits are internalized, 
                                                 
3 Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (New York:  Random 
House, Inc., 1965), 777. Note that The Wealth of Nations was first published in 1776.  The edition and page 
number referenced here is The Modern Library edition published as noted in 1965. 
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the government may act in a capacity similar to that of a private firm and 
the same principles of pricing are appropriate…  By using a market 
mechanism, a more efficient determination of the appropriate level of 
supply becomes possible.4    
 
 The key phrase in the preceding quote relates to an internalization of benefits.  
Subsidies for professional sports are rationalized on the grounds that teams generate 
substantial economic and hedonic value for host cities, external benefit, for which 
individual teams receive no compensation.  If teams qualify as public goods, those that 
are collectively consumed, then the optimum provision of teams and their playing 
facilities require equating the sum of individual marginal utilities, marginal rates of 
substitutions, for host city residents with the marginal cost of attracting and maintaining 
the team.  If the external economic benefit provided by professional sports teams, 
however, is negligible then the rationale for subsidies rests on a contingent valuation or 
hedonic argument.5  If the external benefit is primarily hedonic in character, it is arguable 
that this psychological benefit is substantial for the relatively few city residents who paint 
their faces on game day, and relatively modest for those who kibitz about team 
developments around the coffee machine on Monday morning.  It seems reasonable to 
assume that the hard core fans would attend games regularly, and the less ardent 
followers would be content with occasional attendance.  A combination of a fan 
consumption tax or user fee, personal seat licenses or some other form of surcharge on 
tickets coupled with a small tax increase spread over a city’s population would be the 
least inequitable method for subsidizing the team.  This proposition will be discussed 
further later in the paper. 
 
 In addition to equity considerations, a “good” tax structure minimizes interference 
with otherwise efficient markets or if market imperfections or inefficiencies do exist, then 
a good tax could correct for the imperfections that exist for reasons not related to 
taxation.  The four major professional sports leagues in the United States operate as 
unregulated monopolies, and that qualifies as a market imperfection.  Every student of 
economics understands that monopolies charge higher prices and restrict supply (supply 
less of the good than society would find optimal) in pursuit of maximum profit.  
Professional sport is a subset of the amusement and recreation industry.  If we assume for 
the moment that the amusement and recreation industry is competitive except for the 
professional sports component, it follows in theory that professional sports utilize too few 
resources, resources are underprovided, relative to the remainder of the amusement and 
recreation industry.  If society sought to correct this outcome through imposing taxes or 
providing subsidies, then the amusement and recreation industry other than professional 
sports should be taxed and/or the professional sports industry should be subsidized.  The 
professional sports industry would prefer the subsidy solution for obvious reasons, and to 
                                                 
4 Richard A. and Peggy B. Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice (New York:  McGraw-Hill 
Book Company, 1980), 240. 
5 The vast majority of independent scholarly work on the external economic benefit induced by 
professional sports supports the hypothesis that professional sports fails to generate little if any additional 
economic activity.  See for example, Roger G. Noll and Andrew Zimbalist, ed., Sports, Jobs & Taxes 
(Washington, D.C.:  The Brookings Institution, 1997). 
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“correct” for the underutilization of resources in the professional sports industry, society 
has adopted this course of action.  
 
 The efficacy of the subsidy solution depends on the responsiveness of the quantity 
to a decrease in the marginal cost of production or a shift of the monopolist’s supply 
curve to the right.  If the monopolist’s supply curve is perfectly inelastic, fixed supply, 
then the supply is invariant with respect to the change in marginal cost, and the society 
providing the subsidy receives the same amount of the good, the same number of seats, at 
a higher social cost.  In fact, in an odd twist, the subsidies that society does provide for 
professional sports are often used to replace stadiums that have become economically 
obsolete.  A primary driver for new stadium construction is luxury seating.  The pursuit 
of the special “ambiance” that comes from smaller ballparks (from the producer’s point 
of view, an increase in capacity utilization) in professional baseball at least, has involved 
replacing seats available to the general public with loges and other luxury 
accommodations available for an elite audience.  The public subsidies provide nothing 
more in such cases with a convenient means through which the monopolist can price 
discriminate.   
 
 Team revenues will increase with an increase in supply, a shift to the right in a 
perfectly inelastic supply curve (fixed number of stadium seats), if the price elasticity of 
demand exceeds one.  Even then the team motivated by profit maximization might not 
have an incentive to increase supply if seats available for sale to the public for individual 
games substitute for more lucrative luxury seating as noted above.  In fact, the modern 
sports facility in the United States can be thought of as a collection of distinct game-day 
experiences differentiated by more than sight lines.  Revenue sharing arrangements 
peculiar to the league,6 capacity constraints defined by the distance of remote seating to 
the playing surface,7 and the market for luxury seating all factor into the stadium design 
and seating capacity.  There has been a trend in professional baseball in North America to 
build smaller stadiums to enhance the ambiance and spectator experience and to eliminate 
chronic “off-peak” excess capacity.8   
 
The point is that imperfections or inefficiencies that exist in the market for 
professional sports in the abstract have the potential for correction through taxes or 
subsidies only if certain conditions with regard to demand exist.  Even then the rapidly 
changing financial character of the professional sports industry does not necessarily lend 
                                                 
6  Jerry Jones, the owner of the Dallas Cowboys, for example, reportedly extracted individual seats to make 
room for luxury seating.  This redesign of seating in Cowboys Stadium had to do, at least in part, with the 
NFL revenue sharing arrangement, which exempted revenue from luxury seating but not the seats removed.  
Through this stadium modification Jones avoided the “40 percent” league tax.  
7  The stadium in which the Chicago White Sox currently play, U.S. Cellular Field, had to be modified 
given the steepness of the slope in the upper grandstand to try to bring the action on the playing field closer 
to fans in the upper grandstand.  The extreme cantilever was created by placing several stories of skyboxes 
between the upper and lower grandstand.   
8  As the regular season has lengthened, each regular season game has less incremental value in determining 
a champion.  For teams that fail to compete, large stadiums with small crowds contribute negatively to the 
fan experience, and discourage future demand.  Professional sports teams depend on season ticket holders, 
repeat customers, to a significant degree, and excess capacity to the extent that it detracts from the 
excitement of the game, has long-term financial implications for the team.   
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itself to classic solutions long term.  In professional baseball, for example (see Table 2 
below), subsidies have been used to reduce supply and raise prices resulting in windfall 
profits for teams at public expense in some instances.  In Tables 1 and 2 below, the 
seating capacities for old and new stadiums in the NFL and for Major League Baseball 
(MLB) have been recorded. 
 
Table 1 
Seating Capacities for New and Old NFL Stadiums 
 
Present City 
Former 
Stadium Year 
Built 
Seating 
Capacity 
Present Stadium 
Year Built or 
Renovated 
Present Seating 
Capacity 
St. Louis 1966 60,000 1995 67,000 
Atlanta 1965 60,700 1992 71,228 
Tampa 1967 74,301 1998 75,000 
Green Bay 1957 60,789 2003 71,500 
Washington 1961 56,454 1997 80,116 
Pontiac 1975 80,311 2002 65,000 
Chicago 1924 66,944 2003 61,500 
Philadelphia 1971 65,352 2003 66,000 
Houston 1965 59,969 2002 69,500 
Cleveland 1931 78,512 1999 73,200 
Cincinnati 1970 60,389 2000 65,600 
Foxboro 1971 60,292 2002 68,000 
Seattle 1976 66,403 2002 67,000 
Memphis 1965 62,380 1999 68,798 
Baltimore 1953 60,020 1998 69,426 
Denver 1948 76,273 2001 76,125 
Oakland 1966 63,026 1998 63,132 
Pittsburgh 1970 59,594 2001 65,000 
Buffalo 1973 80,024 1999 73,976 
San Diego 1967 59,022 1997 71,500 
average   65,538    69,430  
 
Sources: Robert A. Baade and others, “A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Hudson Yards Multi-Use Athletic 
and Exhibition Facility (MUF),” Mimeograph (July 2004). 
Paul Minsey and Cory Suppes, Stadiums, http://football.ballparks.com/. 
Stadiums of the NFL: From the Past to the Future, 
http://www.stadiumsofnfl.com/afc/QualcommStadium.htm. 
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Table 2 
Seating Capacities for New and Old MLB Stadiums 
Present City 
Former 
Stadium Year 
Built 
Seating 
Capacity 
Present Stadium 
Year Built or 
Renovated 
Present Seating 
Capacity 
Arlington 1972 43,521 1994 49,200 
Houston 1965 54,816 2000 40,950 
Atlanta 1966 52,013 1997 49,831 
San Francisco 1960 57,546 2000 41,503 
Chicago 1910 52,000 1991 41,000 
Cleveland 1932 74,400 1994 42,865 
Milwaukee 1956 53,192 2001 42,400 
Seattle 1977 59,100 1999 47,116 
Baltimore 1954 54,000 1992 48,876 
Denver 1993 76,098 1995 50,445 
Cincinnati 1970 40,008 2003 42,059 
Pittsburgh 1970 47,952 2001 38,365 
Detroit 1912 52,400 2000 40,637 
Philadelphia 1971 62,623 2004 43,500 
San Diego 1968 47,972 2004 46,000 
average   55,176  44,316 
 
Source: Ballparks of Baseball: The Fields of Major League Baseball, http://www.ballparksofbaseball.com/. 
 
 The data arrayed in Tables 1 and 2 indicate that on average the new NFL stadiums 
have larger seating capacities than those that they replaced, but seating capacities have 
shrunk for MLB stadiums on average.  The reason for that may well be the relative 
infrequency of NFL games.  There is greater interest in each NFL game which translates 
into high capacity utilization rates in those stadiums compared to MLB where an 81-
game home schedule diminishes the importance of individual games all else equal.  The 
contraction of MLB stadiums may well be an attempt to capture the success of the Boston 
Red Sox at Fenway Park and the Chicago Cubs at Wrigley Field.  The capacity utilization 
rates at present at Fenway and Wrigley are 97.2 and 97.7 percent, respectively.9  The 
ambiance and experience of attending a game is enhanced by involved fans in an intimate 
space, and Fenway and Wrigley offer that kind of experience both inside and outside the 
ballpark (Yawkey Way in Boston and Wrigleyville in Chicago).  The point once again is 
that it should be expected that a system of taxes and subsidies, a decrease in the marginal 
costs incurred by teams does not necessarily result in an increase supply of seats for 
professional sporting events.  Indeed, a subsidy may even be used to reduce the number 
of seats available to the public, and in such instances the subsidy provides a windfall for 
the team.   
 
 A good tax system also should be designed so that it is understandable to the 
taxpayer.10  A lack of transparency in the tax code confuses consumers or requires an 
                                                 
9  David Haugh, “Game’s Grande Dames,” Chicago Tribune, June 12, 2005, 12-13. 
10  Musgrave and Musgrave, Public Finance in Theory and Practice, 235. 
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investment in information or knowledge that may exceed the potential benefits to the 
individual, but not to the sum of individuals.  The information itself where stadium 
funding is concerned exhibits a public goods character that extends beyond the host 
community.  It would appear credible, for example, at first blush to say that the 
imposition of a hotel tax in a city hosting a team would pay for a new stadium with 
nonresident funds.  Transient taxes give the impression that residents will be spared the 
burden of paying, but that is more likely to be true if the city imposing a transient tax is 
the only city to do so.  The reality, however, is quite different as host cities have sought 
means to raise revenues for sports facilities that minimize public resistance.  The sports 
stadium funding issue in many ways manifests the fallacy of composition.  Do taxpayers 
understand that they may not be shouldering the tax burden in their home community for 
stadium construction, but on a national level, they are paying for stadiums in part because 
their home community has attempted to deflect the tax burden and other cities have 
retaliated by adopting similar policy?   It is often the case that a city will justify increases 
in a nonresident tax by noting that other cities “have done it to us.”  The inefficiencies 
potentially associated with professional sports exhibit a national character, at least to 
some degree.  The retaliation noted clearly has national implications.  It is important, 
therefore, to discuss the nature of current sports facilities funding strategies to better 
fashion methods for eliminating inequities and inefficiencies created through publicly 
financing sports facilities.  In the next section of the paper the nature of strategies for 
funding sports stadium in major league host cities are identified and discussed. 
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III.  Financing Professional Sports Facilities    
 
 It is important to review a history of the funding for professional sports stadiums 
in the United States.  Table 3 provides historical information on the number and cost of 
stadiums in the U.S. as well as information relating to the public subsidies.   
 
 
 
Table 3 
Subsidies for Sports Stadiums in the United States  
Constructed Between 1887-2002 
 
Period Number of 
Stadiums 
Built 
Number of 
Stadiums 
Publicly 
Financed 
Cost of 
Stadiums 
(In Millions 
of 1997 
Dollars) 
Public 
Subsidies  
(In Millions 
of 1997 
Dollars) 
Percent of 
Construction 
Percentage 
Publicly  
Financed 
1887-1939 27 5 493.64 155.04 31.4 
1887-1923 14 0 129.76 0 0 
1923-1939 13 5 363.88 155.04 42.6 
1947-1959 8 7 163.23 161.51 98.9 
1960-1969 25 21 2,601.40 1,720.71 66.1 
1970-1979 32 29 4,279.45 3,989.24 93.2 
1980-1986 13 13 822.0 764 92.9 
1987-1999 55 51 9,488.73 6,220.19 70.6 
2000-2002 18 17 4,968.00 3,119.40 62.8 
2003-? 15 14 4,726.30 4,270.00 90.4 
Total 1887-? 193 157 27,542.75 20,400.09 74.1 
Source:  Raymond J. Keating, “Sports Pork:  The Costly Relationship between Major League Sports and 
Government,” Policy Analysis, no. 339 (1999). 
 
The information recorded in Table 3 indicates several noteworthy developments.  
First, the number of stadiums built in the United States has increased over time.  
Furthermore, the pace of construction has accelerated with more than half of the stadiums 
currently in use having been constructed since 1987.  In this year, Joe Robbie, the owner 
of the NFL Miami Dolphins at the time, unable to get approval for public funding for 
renovating the Orange Bowl in Miami, parlayed revenue from the lease and sale of 
luxury seating and personal seat licenses (PSLs) into the financing necessary to build his 
own stadium.  The mining of these new sources of revenue by Robbie represents a 
watershed in stadium economics, and has become a part of the financial blueprint for 
other stadium projects.   
 
Second, Robbie’s financial creativity did not preclude public funding.  The 
evidence recorded in Table 3 suggests that PSLs and luxury seating provided additional 
revenues for owners rather than substituting dollar for dollar for public funds.  While not 
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all stadiums have been primarily financed with public money during the recent surge in 
stadium construction in the United States, the vast majority of them have been.  
Furthermore, the fraction of stadiums receiving some public funding has remained 
relatively constant since the early 1950s.  It should be noted that public subventions take 
many forms, some of which are difficult to quantify.  When stadium infrastructure, land 
acquisition subsidies, zoning variations, and tax abatements are figured into the 
subvention equation, every stadium project in the past three or four decades has received 
some public financial support.  The figures in Table 3 do not include billions of dollars in 
subsidies for tax-free municipal bonds, interest paid on debt, smaller renovations, 
facilities for which information was not available, lost property and other tax revenues 
not paid on facilities, taxpayer money risked on failed venues, direct government 
subsidies paid to teams, and subsidies for minor league facilities.11 
 
Third, stadium construction costs are increasing in both nominal and real terms.  
Escalating construction costs are responsible, at least to some extent, for the increase in 
the size of stadium subsidies.  The public sector in general is contributing absolutely 
more for stadium construction in both real and nominal terms.  
 
To summarize, the number of stadiums that have been built since 1987 to the 
present is unprecedented.  Approximately 80 percent of the professional sports facilities 
in the United States will have been replaced or have undergone major renovation during 
this period of time.  The new facilities have cost more than $19 billion in total, and the 
public has provided $13.6 billion, or 71 percent, of that amount.  In few, if any, instances 
have professional teams in the United States been required to open their books to justify 
the need for these subsidies.  Rather, teams have convinced cities that to remain 
competitive on the field they have to be competitive financially, and this, teams claim, 
cannot be achieved without new playing venues.  
 
The trends in NFL stadium financing follow a pattern of innovation and imitation. 
Painting with the broadest possible strokes and for the purposes of this analysis, the 
innovation relates primarily to the discovery of new revenue streams spawned in part by 
actual or threatened changes in tax laws regarding stadium funding.  The decline in the 
public finance percentage noted for 1986 through 2002 can be explained by six 
developments:  (1) the sale or lease of luxury seating, the Joe Robbie innovation 
previously noted (not a dollar for dollar replacement for public funding – see previous 
comment); (2) the 1986 Tax Reform Act, which, among other things, terminated 
industrial development bonds (IDBs) for “sports facilities” (some 
transition/grandfathering allowed); (3) the sale of “personal seat licenses (PSLs)” by the 
                                                 
11  It should be noted that the use of tax exempt bonds for playing facilities has been tightened over time, 
and there have been recent attempts to limit their use completely as discussed below.  Other tax related 
issues regarding NFL stadium financing have surfaced, e.g., the tax-exempt status of loans from the NFL to 
individual teams, and congressional representatives from both political parties such as Senator Arlen 
Specter (R-Pa) and Representative Barney Frank (D-Mass) have expressed concern about the financial 
windfall for the NFL as a consequence of the favorable tax treatment extended the IRS in its stadium loan 
program to individual teams.   
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Carolina Panthers in 1993;12 (4) the St. Louis Rams use of a government agency to sell 
PSLs, which avoided a significant tax burden assumed by the Carolina Panthers in their 
sale of PSLs in 1993;13 (5) the release of final regulations by the federal government on 
private activity bonds on January 10, 1997; and (6) the attempt by the late Senator Daniel 
Patrick Moynihan to reintroduce legislation to eliminate the use of tax-exempt financing 
for professional sports facilities.14  The “Moynihan Bill” apparently died in committee, 
but it sent a strong signal to professional sports leagues that public sentiment against the 
use of tax-exempt financing for their private gain was strengthening. 
 
These six developments arguably have contributed to a discernible change in 
strategies and methods for financing professional sports facilities.  Before identifying and 
discussing the change in strategies, it would be useful to list the public sector funding 
sources for stadium financing in recent times.  They include:  (1) sales taxes; (2) 
hotel/motel taxes; (3) car rental taxes; (4) general revenue bonds; (5) tax increment 
financing (TIF); (6) lottery funds; (7) ticket surcharges; (8) parking revenues; (9) sin 
taxes; (10) revenues, surplus and otherwise, from other government agencies or funds 
such as the $13.5 million of construction fund investment income used to fund the 
stadium for the Cincinnati Bengals;15 and (11) sale of assets owned by the government, 
e.g., to help fund the stadium for the Detroit Lions, Wayne County sold $20 million 
worth of “surplus land.”16  In Table 4 below information to the extent it is available is 
provided on the mixed use of these 12 revenue sources for funding stadiums. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12  Josh Peter, “Building NFL Fortunes,” The Dallas Morning News, 2002, 
http://apse.dallasnews.com/contest/2002/writing/over250/over250.enterprise.fourth1.html.  
13  Ibid. 
14  Martin J. Greenberg, The Stadium Game, 2nd ed. (Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 
2000), 170.  Mr. Greenberg provides more detailed information in his “Exhibit D:  Development of Tax 
Law Principles Relating to Sports Facility Bonds,” pp. 170-171 of his text. 
15 Horrow Sports Ventures, “Representative NFL Stadium Public/Private Partnerships,” September 12, 
2002, http://www.sandiego.gov/chargersissues/pdf/horrow.pdf. 
16 Ibid. 
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Table 4 
Information Regarding Sources of Funds  
for Stadium Construction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources:  (1) Horrow Sports Ventures, “Representative NFL Stadium Public/Private Partnerships,” 
September 12, 2002, http://www.sandiego.gov/chargersissues/pdf/horrow.pdf. It should be noted that the 
information contained in Table 2 differs from Table 1.  This may be due to whether items such as ticket 
surcharges, parking revenues, naming rights, and PSLs are counted as public or private funding. (2) Robert 
A. Baade and others, “A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Hudson Yards Multi-Use Athletic and Exhibition 
Facility (MUF),” Mimeograph (July 2004).  (3) Atlanta stadium construction date from Citizens Union 
Foundation, Football Stadiums, http://gothamgazette.com/stadiums/.  (4) Arizona stadium construction date 
from Arizona Sports and Tourism Authority, Cardinals Stadium Construction Update, http://www.az-
tsa.com/cardinals/update.html. 
 
City/Statistics Year Built 
public 
contribution 
(%) 
Sales 
Tax 
Hotel/ 
Motel 
Tax 
Car 
Rental 
Tax 
Ticket 
Surcharge 
"Sin" 
Tax PSL 
General 
Funds Referendums Lottery 
Atlanta 1992 100.00  yes (2.75%)      no  
Carolina 1995 22.92       yes
a  no  
Jacksonville 1995 90.68 yes yes   yes   yes no  
St. Louis 1995 100.00  yes (2.5%)     
Yes 
($257 mill) no  
Washington 1997 27.03         no  
Baltimore 1998 89.29         no yes 
Oakland 1998 100.00       yes
b  no  
Tampa Bay 1998 91.07 yes (.5%)       yes  
Buffalo 1999 100.00        yes no  
Cleveland 1999 70.67  yes yes yes (2%) yes yes  yes  
Tennessee 1999 75.34  yes    yes      ($72 mill)  yes  
Cincinnati 2000 94.44 yes (.5%)   yes  
yes       
($25 mill)  yes  
Denver 2001 62.16 yes        yes  
Pittsburgh 2001 58.97    yes ($14 mill)  
yes       
($42 mill)  no  
Detroit 2002 26.54  yes (1%) 
yes 
(2%)     yes  
Houston 2002 72.88  yes yes yes yes yes   yes  
New England 2002 17.24         no  
Seattle 2002 63.66 yes yes (2%)  
yes 
(10%)  
yes       
($17 mill)  yes yes 
Chicago 2003 66.10  yes (2%)    
yes       
($60 mill)  no  
Green Bay 2003 57.28 yes (.5%)   
yes ($92.5M 1 
time charge)    yes  
Philadelphia 2003 36.38         no  
Arizona 2006 66.18  yes (1%) 
yes 
($3.50)     yes  
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a PSLs/ticket surcharges that are represented in bold and underlined qualify as private financing, or, in other 
words, represent team contributions for financing stadium construction. 
b PSLs/ticket surcharges that are not underlined or emboldened represent public financial contributions.  
Only one such PSL is represented as public in this table.   
 
 The information recorded in Table 4 indicates at least five things worth noting.  
First, the numbers indicate that sales taxes and car rental taxes are being used with 
increasing frequency.  In fact, compared to the period 1992 and 1999, the number of 
cities using sales taxes and car rental taxes from 2000 to the present to fund stadiums has 
doubled and tripled, respectively, albeit the incidence of their use is still relatively small.  
Second, hotel taxes continue to be popular in stadium financing with almost half of the 
sports facilities projects using hotel taxes.  Third, there have been no general funds used 
to back stadium projects since 1999, but that could change with the stadium proposed for 
the New York Jets in West Manhattan.17  The size of the Jets’ project and public subsidy, 
currently reported at $600 million could necessitate the use of general funds.  Fourth, 
ticket surcharges of one form or another, one-time fee (Green Bay) or taxes imposed with 
each ticket sale (Cleveland), are being used with increasing frequency.  Ticket surcharges 
were imposed twice in the period 1992 to 1999 in the NFL, but were employed on five 
stadium projects during the period 2000 to the present.  Fifth, during the period 1992 
through 1999, only two of the eleven stadium projects were subjected to a referendum.  
Between 2000 and 2006 eight of the eleven stadium projects identified in Table 2 were 
decided through a referendum.   
 
In summarizing these results, nine of the possible forty-four cells for sales, hotel, 
car-rental, and sin taxes for NFL stadium construction were filled in the eight-year 
period, 1992 through 1999.  If Cleveland is excluded only six of those cells contained an 
observation.  Thirteen of these forty-four cells, by contrast, were filled in the 2000 
through 2006 period.  If ticket surcharges are included in the analysis, then eleven of the 
fifty-five cells (seven of the fifty-five if Cleveland is excluded) were filled during the 
1992 through 1999 period in contrast to eighteen of the fifty-five cells during the 2000 
through 2006 period. 
 
 Taken together these developments suggest a hypothesis.  To wit, the evidence 
arguably suggests that residents of NFL host cities have increasingly resisted the use of 
their tax money to fund the construction of new stadiums.  It could be that the increasing 
                                                 
17 General funds have been used to fund stadiums since 1992 on only three occasions, and in all thee 
instances it may be more an indication of an inordinately compliant host or potential host city.  When 
Buffalo devoted a relatively small amount of funds to the renovation of Ralph Wilson Stadium, it may have 
been at least in part because Buffalo is a very small NFL city.  Cleveland provided currency for NFL 
threats to relocate teams from those cities that are reluctant to finance new facilities.  Prior to Buffalo only 
St. Louis and Jacksonville in 1995 used general funds in NFL stadium projects.  St. Louis was desperate to 
replace the Cardinals after they relocated to Phoenix, Arizona, and Jacksonville, a small market by NFL 
standards, may have felt the use of general funds was a necessary expedient to secure the financing they 
needed to renovate the “Gator Bowl” to attract the NFL.  Concerning the proposed new stadium for the 
New York Jets, during the first week of June the decision was made not to fund it.  The amount of the 
public subsidy was a major hurdle the Jets were not able to negotiate.  The stadium proposals currently 
being advanced by the MLB New York Mets and Yankees together involve a public contribution less than 
that initially proposed for the Jets.   
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number of stadium referendums coupled with the rejection of the use of general funds to 
finance venue construction indicates growing taxpayer antipathy.  Furthermore, as 
indicated earlier in the paper, it has become more difficult for teams to get tax-exempt 
financing directly to finance stadium projects.  The NFL and host cities have had to find 
ways to fund their stadium projects using financing techniques and strategies that are 
more tolerable for taxpayers.  Transient and car-rental taxes create the impression that 
outsiders will shoulder the financial burden related to stadium construction.  Sales taxes 
are generally imposed in amounts that create the impression that the financial burden 
imposed on individual taxpayers is insignificant.  Sin taxes are imposed more frequently 
because it appears to be the case that society is more inclined to tax those whose 
behaviors are perceived to be a social burden.  Ticket surcharges are approved arguably 
because at least one group that clearly derives benefit from a public subsidy pays.   
 
 The manner in which the NFL has addressed the increased difficulty of getting 
tax-exempt financing for stadiums is worth considering at some length, because it 
provides a good example of the modification in league financial strategies as a 
consequence of legislative pressures.  Lack of access to tax exempt bonds for sports 
facilities can break a project through a substantial increase in the cost of debt service.  
The NFL has aggressively supported a stadium construction binge, and one aspect of that 
support has been to find an end-around play to replace tax exemptions for stadium 
construction bonds.  The G-3 loan program has proved the perfect counter to what the 
NFL has considered overzealous play on the part of government in limiting the use of 
tax-free municipal bonds.  The NFL program, perhaps not coincidentally, was used first 
in 1999,18 the year the final version of the Moynihan bill appeared. Moynihan’s bill 
explicitly proposed eliminating tax-exempt financing for professional sports stadiums and 
arenas.  
 
 The G-3 program is the initiative through which the league office lends money to 
teams seeking to construct a stadium.  The funds teams secure from the NFL G-3 
program are characterized as private financing in representing the mix of private/public 
funds, and increase the team’s advertised contribution to the stadium construction project.  
This, of course, helps secure public funding because it appears that the team is doing its 
part to build the new facility.  Is the G-3 program truly private in character?  A review of 
the mechanics relating to the lending program reveals a distinct public aspect.   
 
 To qualify for a G-3 loan, the NFL requires that a “public/private partnership” to 
finance the stadium be in place.19  If approved for the loan, the League will lend the team 
up to $150 million for the project in large markets and up to $100 million in smaller 
markets.20  The NFL is able to borrow money from banks at very low-interest rates given 
the League’s financial stature, and the NFL loans the money to individual teams at a rate 
slightly above the amount at which it secures the loan.  The NFL, for example, recently 
                                                 
18 Josh Peter, “Building NFL Fortunes,” The Dallas Morning News, 2002, 
http://apse.dallasnews.com/contest/2002/writing/over250/over250.enterprise.fourth1.html. 
19 Josh Peter ,“Bank of NFL; Sure, if NFL Teams can secure taxpayer money,” The Dallas Morning News, 
2002, http://apse.dallasnews.com/contest/2002/writing/over250/over250.enterprise.fourth2.html. 
20 Ibid. 
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loaned the Seattle Seahawks $63 million at a 3.5 percent rate.21  Since the League 
qualifies as a not-for-profit entity, it is eligible for a tax-exemption for the money it 
borrows.22  Indirectly, therefore, the individual teams receive loans at tax-exempt rates.23  
The low rates at which teams borrow have implications for taxes at the federal level.  The 
League’s actions relating to G-3 loans serve to reduce its tax burden, which has to be 
compensated for by higher taxes elsewhere.  Furthermore, the presence of this strategy 
effectively provides an incentive to increase the number of stadiums provided, and given 
the G-3 subsidy, too many resources are devoted to stadium production.  The NFL loan 
program to individual teams, therefore, induces economic inefficiencies.     
 
 Taxpayer resistance has increased arguably due to the perception that residents of 
a community, particularly those of modest means and not ardent sports fans, should not 
be taxed to enhance the financial privilege of owners, players, and wealthy fans who can 
afford to attend games.  The evidence supports the view that NFL owners and players 
have been the financial beneficiaries of public largesse in the past.  The information in 
Tables 5 and 6 corroborate this assertion.  
                                                 
21 Rick Anderson, “After Further Review,” Seattle Weekly, February 12-18, 2003, 
http://www.seattleweekly.com/features/0307/anderson2.php. 
22 Josh Peter, “Building NFL Fortunes,” The Dallas Morning News, 2002, 
http://apse.dallasnews.com/contest/2002/writing/over250/over250.enterprise.fourth1.html. 
23  See for example, Josh Peter , “Critics question league’s tax-exempt activities, “The Dallas Morning 
News, 2002, http://apse.dallasnews.com/contest/2002/writing/over250/over250.enterprise.fourth3.html. It 
should be noted that the NFL’s G-3 policy and its implications have been noted by congress, and steps may 
be taken to thwart the NFL’s clever scheme to circumvent legislation designed to prevent the tax-exempt 
financing of stadiums. 
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Table 5 
NFL Franchise Values Before and After  
Stadium Construction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Robert A. Baade and others, “A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Hudson Yards Multi-Use Athletic 
and Exhibition Facility (MUF),” Mimeograph (July 2004).  
Horrow Sports Ventures, “Representative NFL Stadium Public/Private Partnerships,” September 12, 2002, 
http://www.sandiego.gov/chargersissues/pdf/horrow.pdf. 
Martin J. Greenberg, The Stadium Game, 2nd ed. (Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 
2000), 46. 
Citizens Union Foundation,. Football Stadiums, http://gothamgazette.com/stadiums/.  
Arizona Sports and Tourism Authority, Cardinals Stadium Construction Update, http://www.az-
tsa.com/cardinals/update.html. 
  Team 
year 
built 
(t) 
value 
for t-2 
($M) 
value 
for t-1 
($M) 
value for 
year t 
($M) 
value 
for t+1 
($M) 
value for 
t+2 ($M) 
 t-2 value 
as a % of 
year t value 
 t-1value   
as a % of 
year t value 
t+1value  as 
a % of year 
t value 
t+2 value as 
a % of year 
t value 
1 Washington Redskins 1997 151 184 200 403 607 75.5% 92.0% 201.5% 303.5% 
2 Dallas Cowboys                     
3 Houston Texans 2002                   
4 New England Patriots 2002 464 524 571 756  861 81.3% 91.8% 132.4% 150.8% 
5 Cleveland Browns 1999                   
6 Denver Broncos 2001 427 471 540 604 683  79.1% 87.2% 111.9% 126.5% 
7 Tampa Bay Buccaneers 1998 164 187 346 502 532 47.4% 54.0% 145.1% 153.8% 
8 Baltimore Ravens 1998 201 235 329 408 479 61.1% 71.4% 124.0% 145.6% 
9 Carolina Panthers 1995                   
10 Miami Dolphins                     
11 Detroit Lions 2002 378 423 509 635  747 74.3% 83.1% 124.8% 146.8% 
12 Chicago Bears 2003 362 540 621  785   58.3% 87.0% 126.4%   
13 Tennessee Titans 1999 193 322 369 506 536 52.3% 87.3% 137.1% 145.3% 
14 Philadelphia Eagles 2003 405 518 617  833   65.6% 84.0% 135.0%   
15 Seattle Seahawks 2002 407 440 534 610  712 76.2% 82.4% 114.2% 133.3% 
16 Green Bay Packers 2003 392 474 609  756   64.4% 77.8% 124.1%   
17 Pittsburgh Steelers 2001 397 414 468 557 608  84.8% 88.5% 119.0% 129.9% 
18 St. Louis Rams 1995                   
19 Kansas City Chiefs                     
20 New Orleans Saints                     
21 Oakland Raiders 1998 162 210 235 299 315 68.9% 89.4% 127.2% 134.0% 
22 New York Giants                     
23 Jacksonville Jaguars 1995                   
24 San Francisco 49ers                     
25 New York Jets                     
26 Buffalo Bills 1999 200 252 326 365 393 61.3% 77.3% 112.0% 120.6% 
27 Cincinnati Bengals 2000 311 394 423 479 507 73.5% 93.1% 113.2% 119.9% 
28 San Diego Chargers 1997 153 169 191 248 323 80.1% 88.5% 129.8% 169.1% 
29 Indianapolis Colts                     
30 Minnesota Vikings                     
31 Atlanta Falcons 1992                   
32 Arizona Cardinals 2006                   
 average  297.938 359.813 430.5 546.625 561.7692 69% 84% 127% 130% 
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“Team Valuations 1998 to 2004,” Forbes, 2004, 
http://www.forbes.com/finance/lists/30/2004/LIR.jhtml?passListId=30&passYear=2004&passListType=Mi
sc&uniqueId=308211&datatype=Misc. 
  
 The statistics recorded in Table 5 indicate that on the basis of a weighted average 
of team revenues stadiums increase franchise values by 52 percent from the year before a 
new stadium is built to the year after.  In addition all stadiums do enhance franchise 
values by a substantial amount following the construction of the stadium.24  Increased 
revenues are responsible for the capital appreciation, but it is interesting that in some 
cases, the Washington Redskins, for example, the entire appreciation cannot be explained 
by the return to the stadium asset.25  In some instances there appears to be a 
magnification effect.  The numbers arrayed in Table 5 echo conclusions reached during 
the Oakland Raiders trial when the NFL books were opened during the course of 
litigation. Quoting from a story that appeared in latimes.com, the authors wrote: 
  
 Confidential National Football League financial documents, never 
before seen in full detail even by the 31 teams in the league, reveal a 
robust enterprise that gets more so each year as team after team moves 
into new or renovated stadiums, many paid for by taxpayers.26 
 
  
                                                 
24  A word of caution with regard to the calculations is in order.  The 52 percent figure is derived by 
dividing the average franchise value for t+1 by the franchise value for t-1 ($546.625 million/$359.813 = 
1.52 or 152%).  If the average is calculated by summing the information in the percentage columns and 
dividing by the number of new or renovated stadiums, then each observation is valued equally in the 
percentage columns and not weighted in a way that is implicit in an average calculation derived from the 
data in the rows for individual teams.  Individual team data is expressed using dollars as the dimension.  
Percentages are without dimension.  Incidentally, the most recent data available indicates that the 
Washington Redskins are the most valuable team in the NFL at $1.104 billion as of 2004.  
25 The Redskins reported a second-place league profit of $32.4 million in 1999 (See Alan Abrahamson and 
Sam Farmer, “NFL Ledgers Reveal Profits Depend on New Stadiums,” 
http://www.latimes.com/sports/updates2/lat_nfl0105.htm.).  The discounted present value of that sum over 
a thirty-year stadium contract is far less than $1.104 billion, the reported value according to Forbes 
Magazine of the Redskins franchise value in 2004. 
26 Alan Abrahamson and Sam Farmer, “NFL Ledgers Reveal Profits Depend on New Stadiums,” 
http://www.latimes.com/sports/updates2/lat_nfl0105.htm. 
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Table 6 
NFL Team Payroll Before and After  
Stadium Construction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Robert A. Baade and others, “A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Hudson Yards Multi-Use Athletic 
and Exhibition Facility (MUF),” Mimeograph (July 2004). 
Citizens Union Foundation, Football Stadiums, http://gothamgazette.com/stadiums/. 
Arizona Sports and Tourism Authority, Cardinals Stadium Construction Update, http://www.az-
tsa.com/cardinals/update.html. 
Rodney Fort, “National Football League Payroll,” 
http://users.pullman.com/rodfort/PHSportsEcon/Common/OtherData/NFLPayroll/NFLPayrollindex.xls. 
 
Team 
year 
built 
(t) 
team 
payroll for 
t-2 
team 
payroll for 
t-1 
team 
payroll for t 
team 
payroll for 
t+1 
team 
payroll for 
t+2 
 t-2 
payroll 
as a % 
of year t 
payroll 
 t-1  
payroll 
as a % of 
year t 
payroll 
t+1  
payroll 
as a % of 
year t 
payroll 
 t+2 
payroll 
as a % of 
year t 
payroll 
Arizona  2006                   
Atlanta  1992                   
Baltimore  1998 $38,938,400 $44,079,000 $53,770,300 $64,956,900 $54,811,100 72.4% 82.0% 120.8% 101.9% 
Buffalo 1999 $39,669,600 $66,426,000 $70,807,400 $54,612,000 $51,602,563 56.0% 93.8% 77.1% 72.9% 
Carolina 1995                   
Chicago  2003 $76,479,893 $71,853,262 $82,803,517 $81,361,350   92.4% 86.8% 98.3%  
Cincinnati 2000 $63,754,600 $59,950,700 $54,171,200 $81,989,628 $57,867,603 117.7% 110.7% 151.4% 106.8% 
Cleveland 1999                   
Dallas                      
Denver 2001 $62,717,400 $50,239,400 $102,582,620 $62,563,073 $64,826,919 61.1% 49.0% 61.0% 63.2% 
Detroit  2002 $54,635,200 $76,573,454 $64,329,265 $77,662,097 $81,130,917 84.9% 119.0% 120.7% 126.1% 
Green Bay  2003 $68,979,435 $49,980,056 $77,230,121 $83,016,450   89.3% 64.7% 107.5%   
Houston  2002                   
Indianapolis                      
Jacksonville 1995                   
Kansas City                      
Miami                     
Minnesota                      
New England 2002 $51,344,300 $65,793,825 $46,194,915 $82,128,250 $71,548,750 111.1% 142.4% 177.8% 154.9% 
New Orleans                     
New York Giants                     
New York Jets                     
Oakland  1998 $48,933,600 $45,695,500 $58,389,500 $64,384,800 $49,143,700 83.8% 78.3% 110.3% 84.2% 
Philadelphia  2003 $70,893,988 $81,929,630 $77,436,900 $84,468,880   91.6% 105.8% 109.1%   
Pittsburgh 2001 $65,902,700 $58,464,200 $77,711,029 $85,283,461 $63,571,735 84.8% 75.2% 109.7% 81.8% 
San Diego  1997 $35,497,800 $43,173,600 $42,986,300 $71,264,400 $50,648,600 82.6% 100.4% 165.8% 117.8% 
San Francisco                      
Seattle  2002 $47,802,600 $81,034,664 $58,320,758 $84,227,732 $86,926,500 82.0% 138.9% 144.4% 149.0% 
St. Louis  1995                   
Tampa Bay  1998 $44,891,800 $49,563,300 $56,104,800 $58,256,100 $58,054,900 80.0% 88.3% 103.8% 103.5% 
Tennessee 1999 $38,439,000 $64,305,000 $64,712,200 $55,487,200 $70,126,673 59.4% 99.4% 85.7% 108.4% 
Washington 1997 $46,752,400 $36,031,000 $43,953,200 $66,664,600 $52,956,800 106.4% 82.0% 151.7% 120.5% 
average  $53,477,045 $59,068,287 $64,469,002 $72,395,433 $62,555,135 83% 92% 112% 97% 
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 New stadiums resulted in increased payrolls for most teams in the NFL, but not 
all.  In six of the sixteen cases of new or renovated stadiums in the NFL identified in 
Table 6, payrolls actually decreased when play began in the new facility.  The fact that 
the evidence indicates that two years prior to the new stadium (t-2) three teams exhibited 
a payroll above that for the year the new or renovated stadium was built suggests that 
payrolls may have been increased the year before in anticipation of new stadium 
revenues.  These results are all the more surprising in light of the fact that the national 
broadcast money, the most important source of revenue in the NFL, has steadily 
increased.  One would expect an upward trend in payrolls for all NFL teams for each year 
if for no other reason than the increase in broadcast revenues.  That makes the decline in 
payrolls for the year in which a new stadium appears all the more unanticipated.  The 
evidence, however, on the whole indicates that player salaries positively correlate with 
new or renovated stadiums as would be expected. 
 
 New stadiums boost revenues in the NFL through selling more seats and through 
the sale or lease of luxury seating.  It should not be too surprising that the average 
weighted ticket price in the NFL increased following the introduction of a new or 
renovated stadium.  As the information in Table 7 below makes clear in only two cases, 
did weighted average ticket prices fall with the appearance of a new NFL facility.  On 
average ticket prices the year before the new stadium were only 77 percent of what they 
averaged the year the new stadium was brought into play.  It is interesting, however, that 
ticket prices have remained stable, even declined a bit on average for teams the year after 
and two years after the new stadium was introduced. 
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Table 7  
NFL Ticket Price Before and After  
Stadium Construction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources: Robert A. Baade and others, “A Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Hudson Yards Multi-Use Athletic 
and Exhibition Facility (MUF),” Mimeograph (July 2004). 
Citizens Union Foundation, Football Stadiums, http://gothamgazette.com/stadiums/. 
Arizona Sports and Tourism Authority, Cardinals Stadium Construction Update, http://www.az-
tsa.com/cardinals/update.html. 
Team year built 
 ticket 
price 
for year 
t-2 
 ticket 
price 
for year 
t-1 
 ticket 
price 
for year 
t 
 ticket 
price 
for year 
t+1 
 ticket 
price 
for year 
t+2 
 t-2 ticket 
price as a 
% of year t 
ticket price 
 t-1 ticket 
price as a 
% of year t 
ticket price 
 t+1 ticket 
price as a 
% of year t 
ticket price 
 t+2 ticket 
price as a 
% of year t 
ticket price 
Atlanta 1992          
Baltimore 1998 $35.68 $37.44 $42.93 $42.75 $42.75 83.11% 87.21% 99.58% 99.58% 
Buffalo 1999 $35.58 $35.58 $40.89 $46.06 $46.06 87.01% 87.01% 112.64% 112.64% 
Carolina 1995          
Chicago 2003 $42.70 $51.42 $65.00 $65.56  65.69% 79.11% 100.86%  
Cincinnati 2000 $37.77 $37.77 $56.21 $56.21 $47.31 67.19% 67.19% 100.00% 84.17% 
Cleveland 1999          
Dallas            
Denver 2001 $46.40 $46.40 $77.41 $52.50 $57.28 59.94% 59.94% 67.82% 74.00% 
Detroit 2002 $39.05 $39.05 $50.23 $53.91 $56.63 77.74% 77.74% 107.33% 112.74% 
Green Bay 2003 $53.51 $50.73 $54.40 $54.40  98.36% 93.25% 100.00%  
Houston 2002          
Indianapolis            
Jacksonville 1995          
Kansas City            
LA Raiders            
LA Rams            
Miami            
Minnesota            
New England 2002 $47.77 $47.77 $76.19 $75.33 $75.33 62.70% 62.70% 98.87% 98.87% 
New Orleans            
NY Giants            
NY Jets            
Oakland Raiders 1998 $51.41 $52.84 $52.84 $51.68 $51.74 97.29% 100.00% 97.80% 97.92% 
Philadelphia 2003 $46.19 $46.19 $64.00 $61.91  72.17% 72.17% 96.73%  
Phoenix            
Pittsburg 2001 $40.76 $40.76 $62.03 $49.83 $54.55 65.71% 65.71% 80.33% 87.94% 
San Diego 1997 $37.96 $38.96 $53.87 $53.87 $53.87 70.47% 72.32% 100.00% 100.00% 
San Francisco            
Seattle 2002 $44.21 $44.97 $43.28 $43.06 $42.80 102.15% 103.90% 99.49% 98.89% 
St. Louis 1995          
Tampa Bay 1998 $33.06 $35.46 $64.58 $64.65 $67.49 51.19% 54.91% 100.11% 104.51% 
Tennessee 1999 $40.75 $45.11 $55.63 $59.33 $60.94 73.25% 81.09% 106.65% 109.55% 
Washington 1997 $35.70 $35.69 $52.92 $62.07 $62.07 67.46% 67.44% 117.29% 117.29% 
average  $41.78 $42.88 $57.03 $55.82 $55.29 73% 75% 98% 97% 
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Rodney Fort, “National Football League Ticket Prices,” 
http://users.pullman.com/rodfort/PHSportsEcon/Common/OtherData/NFLTicketPrice/NFLWATicketIndex
.xls. 
 
 In the next section of the paper, the most current funding strategies used by the 
NFL are evaluated based on equity, efficiency, and transparency.   
   
 
III.        An Evaluation of Current NFL Funding Proposals 
 
A good tax system exhibits three characteristics:  equity, efficiency, and 
transparency.  In this section of the paper, the methods for funding stadiums are evaluated 
based on these criteria.  The primary implication of Tables 5, 6, and 7 is that players, 
fans, and especially owners have benefited from new stadiums.  The evidence recorded in 
Table 3, in particular, indicates that taxpayers have shouldered the majority of the 
financial burden.  Taxpayer resistance has shown signs of galvanizing, and stadium-tax 
strategies reflect that fact.  Transient taxes, car-rental taxes, sin taxes, and small, 
incremental changes in sales taxes have become more popular precisely because stadium 
subsidy proponents recognize the need to placate taxpayers.  Transient and car rental 
taxes give the impression that people outside the community will fund stadium projects.  
Sin taxes do not find ardent opponents, in part, arguably because smoking, drinking, and 
gambling are perceived as socially undesirable and problematic behaviors.  Sales taxes 
are often imposed in multi county areas in small increments precisely because the 
individual incremental tax burdens will be too small to encourage active resistance.  In 
the case of small increases in sales taxes, the professional sports industry has capitalized 
on the idea that it is important to be economically unimportant.   
 
The taxes identified in the previous paragraph that are growing in popularity in 
funding stadiums generally fail any reasonable test of equity.  Transient and car rental 
taxes, which ostensibly deflect the tax burden from residents to nonresidents, have no 
equitable basis for at least two reasons.  First, there is no reason to expect that those who 
rent cars or hotels are sports fans.  Second, it is not always the case that individuals who 
rent hotel rooms or cars are nonresidents.  Many car rentals originate locally as a 
consequence of automobile accidents.  What is there to suggest that those who experience 
auto accidents are sports fans?  Furthermore, since the use of car rental taxes by one 
community inspire retaliatory use by others, a redistribution of tax burdens for those who 
travel, particularly those who travel frequently, results.  If Chicago taxes hotel rooms 
used by Phoenix citizens to build a stadium, and Phoenix increases hotel taxes to fund 
their stadium in retaliation, citizens of Phoenix and Chicago pay for stadiums as a 
consequence of the tax changes.  It is just that they pay for stadiums built in another 
community rather than in their home community.  It is even less likely that a resident of 
Chicago will derive benefit from the stadium in Phoenix and vice versa. 
 
Sin taxes and sales taxes similarly by their nature provide no reason to think that 
those who buy products or services, especially “sinful” products, are sports fans.  Sales 
taxes impose on residents of a multi-county area contiguous to the county, in which the 
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stadium is located, has the “virtue” of being small.  The smaller the tax burden imposed 
on any one person, the less inequitable is the tax used to fund stadiums in an absolute 
sense.  Fairness as a principle, however, is clearly violated when a sales tax is imposed on 
a multi county area to fund a stadium in a neighboring county.  Indeed, as you move 
further away from the home county, fan loyalty likely wanes.  To the extent that people 
from neighboring counties attend games, counties may actually be subsidizing the 
relocation of amusement and recreation spending toward the team’s home community.    
 
Ticket surcharges and PSLs were also mentioned as a funding source growing in 
popularity, and a financial burden is imposed on those who attend games.  For those 
types of taxes, the teams are tapping some of the consumer (fan) surplus, and fans pay for 
the benefit they derive from a new or renovated stadium.  
 
Efficiency can be analyzed through considering the extent to which the profit-
maximizing motivation of the firm(s) induces a market outcome from that which would 
occur in a perfectly competitive situation.  The NFL is an unregulated national monopoly, 
and individual teams are unregulated local monopolies.  The NFL has systematically 
constrained the supply of teams to maintain an excess demand for franchises.  In such a 
case, the marginal social benefit characteristic of the last team exceeds the marginal 
social cost, and to maximize social well being, society wants teams in an amount such 
that marginal social benefit and cost for the last team are equal.  One solution to this 
problem is to encourage the monopolist to supply more at a lower price through a public 
subsidy.  Locally that could mean an increase in the number of seats available to the 
public at lower prices, i.e., larger stadiums.  The public subsidies that have been provided 
for professional sports teams have not always been used to expand seating, but have in 
the case of MLB actually resulted in smaller stadiums at higher prices.  While the NFL 
has expanded the size of their stadiums in general, prices on average have gone up.  The 
price increases are attributable, at least in part, to the sale of luxury seating, but should 
the public be asked to subsidize the construction of stadiums that increasingly exclude 
citizens who pay for the facility.  On efficiency grounds the funding proposals currently 
in place do not generally pass an efficiency test.    
 
The current methods for funding stadiums are anything but transparent.  Indeed 
the emphasis appears to be on trying to make the funding schemes as obscure, trivial, and 
inconsequential to taxpayers as possible.  It is appropriate to describe the nonresident 
taxes to fund stadiums as a national shell game in which citizens of each host city are 
duped into believing that the tax burden for sports facilities can be deflected to citizens 
elsewhere in the country.  This proposition crucially depends on the fact that other cities 
do not adopt a similar strategy.  To ascertain the tax burden imposed on anyone with the 
widespread adoption of transient and car rental taxes is a monumental undertaking, and 
the difficulty of completing such a study serves the interests of those supporting stadium 
subsidies through ostensible nonresident funding.   
 
The G-3 NFL loan program also benefits from the difficulty of tracing its public 
character.  The fact the League functions as a not-for-profit entity allows in an indirect 
way the maintenance of tax-exempt financing for stadiums despite all the legislation 
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designed to eliminate it.  Ironically, and disingenuously, in describing the nature of the 
public-private partnerships in funding stadiums, the NFL loan under the auspices of G-3 
is represented as a portion of the private contribution. 
 
In summary, on equity, efficiency, and transparency grounds, the strategies 
currently employed in the funding of NFL stadiums fail.  
  
 
IV.    Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
 This purpose of this paper was to analyze the evolution of public financing for 
building or renovating stadiums used by the NFL, and to analyze the funding mechanisms 
based on equity, efficiency, and transparency criteria.  Various forces have conspired to 
fashion a movement toward methods for financing stadiums that appear to deflect the tax 
burden to nonresidents, make the individual burden sufficiently small so as to minimize 
tax resistance through maximizing taxpayer apathy, and obscure the financing method so 
that taxpayers have a difficult time determining how the stadium project will affect their 
tax status overall. 
 
 While the increased use of PSLs and ticket tax surcharges should be applauded as 
equitable methods for funding NFL stadium projects, the other funding methods that are 
gaining prominence are not equitable, efficient, or transparent.  Subsidies for NFL teams 
appear to have led to an expansion of NFL seating capacities, but ticket prices have not 
fallen.  The increase in the weighted average ticket price may be attributed, at least in 
part, to the increase in very expensive luxury seating and other luxury amenities at state-
of-the-art NFL stadiums.  Equity principles are clearly violated if public money is used to 
build stadiums that exclude an increasing number of those who provide the subsidy. 
 
 The major policy implication is that cities cannot act alone to compel the design 
of stadium subsidies that are more equitable, efficient, and transparent.  The current 
funding outcome is in large part due to the asymmetry at the bargaining table between the 
NFL and government.  As long as the NFL maintains an excess demand for teams, it can 
play one city off against the other, use in effect a “prisoner’s dilemma” to their 
advantage, to fashion a stadium funding package that maximizes the well being of the 
team and league at the expense of the public.  Since the league is using national market 
conditions to create a strategy that maximizes the interest of local teams, cities must 
develop their own collective or “League of Cities” to countermand the NFL’s power.  
When cities recognize and implement policies based on their shared interests, then 
subsidies for professional sports will no longer be needed.  The reality is that subsidies 
for each team ultimately maintain the status quo with regard to team financial standings, 
and only serve to enhance the absolute wealth of the individual teams and the league.  
Even if value added taxes of 100 percent are  
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imposed at the new stadiums for each event hosted there, the impact of the combined 
subsidy/tax will not be equitable or efficient unless the tax revenues are returned in some 
form in the exact amounts to those who provided funds for stadium construction.  That 
cannot be done without incurring administrative costs.  Once the subsidy is provided 
there will be deadweight losses in any event.  The only policy is not to provide the 
subsidies in the first place, and that can be accomplished only if cities recognize their 
shared interests and act on them in relating to the NFL and other professional sports 
leagues.   
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